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Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis

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With program budgeting, operations research, cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit analysis, and systems analysis, analysts are participating in the policy-making process.¹ Governmental jurisdictions and community groups are seeking to staff "intelligence" functions. We are living in a period when the day-to-day firefighting model of administration is under attack and the notion of study as a prelude to action is becoming the norm. In short, Frederick Taylor seems to be vindicated.

Well not quite. As James Schlesinger put it: "In principle, everyone is for analysis; in practice, there is no certainty that it will be incorporated in the real-world decision process."² After a number of years of working with this real-world decision process, Charles Schultze reflected that "what we can do best analytically we find hardest to achieve politically."³ Obviously, if analysis is to be worthwhile, it cannot go the way of planning activities where studies sit on the shelf and gather dust because of lost political opportunities.

Like the multitude of salmon that set out upstream to spawn, only a few policies get past the hurdles of policy making and reach implementation. Being good bureaucrats, analysts often worry about whether their bosses will push their products. Certainly, the boss must be convinced if the policy alternative is going to have a chance of clearing the hurdles in the rest of the system. Besides the boss, will the rest of the bureaucracy go along? What agencies will be for and against? Will the Office of Management and Budget and the White House accept the idea? What about congressional action and interest group prevention of such action?

Concerned about the weakness of present, economic approaches to analysis, Yehezkel Dror

■ A current deficiency of the analysis of public policy issues by governmental agencies is the slighting of political implications. Analysis should lead to policies that can be implemented, and the study of political feasibility is one way of bridging the gap between the desirable and the possible. Yet one reason that analysts have not considered political feasibility in their studies is the lack of a convenient methodology. As a beginning, a list of categories are suggested that could lead to the mapping of the politics of policy alternatives. These categories include the identification of actors, their beliefs and motivations, resources, and the sites of their interactions. The difficulty of integrating political implications with analytical procedures is explored, and the requirement for anticipatory research is stressed.

suggested that policy making needs the policy analyst. Unlike the deficient system analyst, the policy analyst would pay attention to "the political aspects of public decision making and public policy making (instead of ignoring or condescendingly regarding political aspects). This includes much attention to problems of political feasibility, recruitment of support, accommodations of contradicting goals, and recognition of diversity of values."⁴ Since political feasibility involves support, goals, and values, its study probably will be the lever by which the analyst achieves some measure of usefulness and success. Political feasibility of what, by whom, and how, however?

The investigation of political feasibility, or understanding the future political implications of policy alternatives, depends on the role of the analyst, his political knowledge, and the scope of his policy problems. A junior analyst who is buried in a large agency, who knows a little about his own agency but is ignorant about its political environment, and who is assigned to work on determining

the amount of automobiles to be in the agency's fleet will probably not look at political factors. His main "political" problem will be just getting information to perform on his narrow assignment. At the opposite extreme, an experienced analyst who is working for the leadership of a state legislature, who is a political expert, and who is asked to develop alternative reapportionment plans, will design policies and strategies for effective political acceptance and support.

Suppose our policy analyst is working in the Office of Management and Budget. He knows his role includes political discretion, and he senses his study has serious political implications, but he lacks political expertise. What should he do? He can do nothing and let his boss take his lumps. He can make some quick phone calls to a political expert, such as a lobbyist, a legislative liaison aide, or a political scientist, and check his suspicions. Or he can attempt to investigate systematically the political implications of his work. In this latter case, he will first specify his policy problem's relevant political environment, then he gathers and organizes certain political information, and finally he makes political judgments, estimates of political feasibility, which will aid the design of policy alternatives.

The Relevant Environment: Policy Issue Areas

For each policy alternative the analyst explores a series of conditional statements: if we recommend X, Y will support it and Z will oppose it. Before the analyst can do this, however, he needs a way of linking his alternatives to their relevant political environment. In my own work I have found such a link by first defining a *policy space* and then its related *policy issue area*.

A policy space is more inclusive than a policy issue area and contains those political ingredients that help us understand a broad problem area such as health or education. Every political system contains a number of overlapping policy spaces. There is a health policy space, an education policy space, and a transportation policy space. The space is characterized by a stable set of actors whose specific policy preferences are ambiguous. Because of their continuing concern, certain actors and certain attentive publics dominate the policy space. No one can doubt that the American Medical Association, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the House Ways and Means Committee have something to say in the

health policy space. Whether these actors will exercise their potential is a matter that leads to defining policy issue areas.

While the policy space provides a beginning clue to the political environment, the policy issue area is that part of the environment which is tied to a particular policy analysis. It delimits the chunk of reality which is the subject of analysis. Health insurance, biomedical research, hospital construction, and group delivery of medical services are all policy issue areas within the more inclusive policy space, health.

Both previous political action and the analyst's choice of boundaries define the policy issue area. Defining one policy issue area leads to defining others. Health insurance for the aged leads to health insurance for the young, and in all likelihood for the entire nation. The substance of the policy facilitates the definition of the policy issue area. Specifying the target (health insurance for the aged) and the resource input (hospital construction) are common ways to define areas.

Besides substance, there are other dimensions of a policy, such as time and visibility, which aid the analyst not only to outline boundaries but also to ascertain probable political activity. Some policies, for example those relating to large capital expenditures, cover longer periods of time than others. Within a specific period of time, some policies allow for frequent and continuous political activity; others for infrequent. Major tax reform, for example, occurs infrequently, while property tax decisions occur annually. Some policies are on an established time schedule. They come up for consideration in a predictable manner because of a legislative cycle and funding requirements. Visibility is another important dimension. Welfare reform efforts are currently quite visible. A number of years ago, America's space program was highly visible despite its complexity, but lately has lost political support and public attention.

Organizing Political Information

One way of organizing political information on policy alternatives is to write a paper and pencil scenario.⁵ Scenarios deal with the future, they are not statements of the past nor case histories.⁶ They simply take what we know about the politics of present policy issue areas and apply it to the selection and evaluation of future policy alternatives. Drafting a political scenario is more an art than a science. It is an act of speculation and

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1972

conjecture. Using extrapolation, analogy, known causal relations, facts and fancies, the scenario depicts a policy's political feasibility.

Describing future political possibilities is not easy. This task can be made easier, however, by developing a standard list of political categories for policy analysis.⁷ Every observer has such a list in his head when he examines politics, but there may be significant differences because of differing theoretical perspectives. As a way of getting started, I suggest the following broad, somewhat traditional, categories which the analyst should gather information about for his policy issue area: (1) actors, (2) motivations, (3) beliefs, (4) resources, (5) sites, and (6) exchanges.

Actors

Within a policy issue area, actors are differentiated by their policy positions. At first there are friends, enemies, and fence-sitters. Soon the dynamics of politics pushes the actors to take sides. Those who are for and those who are against a particular policy become identified. For example, throughout the lengthy history of Medicare, the AMA and the private insurance companies were in the "against" camp while the AFL/CIO was in the "for" camp.⁸ The degree of polarization is a function of the particular issue area and context of decision making.⁹

Actors are also differentiated by their activity. Some actors are more concerned than others. They have more to lose or gain than other actors. They work harder to defeat or to support a policy. Some actors have a more limited scope of concern than others. In California school finance, for example, utility companies worry more about changes in their property tax liability than about the financial problems of school districts.

The analyst should not restrict himself to an atomized approach. An actor is an open-ended term which the analyst adapts to fit the requirements of his study. An actor can be an individual, a role, a group, a committee, a bureaucracy, a coalition, or even a state.

If the time frame for the analysis is long range, the policy analyst should probably simplify his task and designate actors by an organizational aggregate: i.e., House Ways and Means Committee for long range, Wilbur Mills for short range. Aggregation is helpful partly because we may lack necessary information for more detailed breakdowns. Also it affords the convenience of aggregating like-minded actors. In the former case, the

analyst does not know enough to differentiate; in the latter case, the analyst knows enough not to differentiate.

Identifying actors who will influence policy is still no mean trick, as students of community power will quickly attest.¹⁰ Reputations and past decisions provide clues but are still inadequate. It seems that no sooner do we get started than we find that there is no reliable method of predicting who will come into the political arena. Nevertheless, for the moment, let me postpone discussing the problem of inaccurate political judgments and assume that the policy analyst can develop a list of actors.

Motivations

Each actor has a range of motives, needs, desires, drives, goals, objectives, all of which encourage him to assert his policy preferences or respond to the policy preferences of others. One problem with using motivations as a category of political analysis is that they are highly idiosyncratic, being a function not only of the individual but also of time and place. Yet, we also know that one actor's motivation also determines the price that another actor will have to pay for the former's political support. The analyst has little choice in this matter. He has to find out what the actors will want or take.¹¹ If a pivotal actor's price is so high that he cannot possibly be satisfied, then the question of political feasibility is, for the most part, resolved. Motivations are a rough guide to what will succeed or what the traffic will bear.

Analysts will have more trouble than politicians discovering the relationship of an actor's motivations to a particular policy alternative. Indeed, there may be no direct relation, as the prevalence of logrolling among actors demonstrates. The coalition builder prefers a side payment which does not modify his policy preferences. Therefore, he does not forget the fence-sitter, who is indifferent to a proposed policy. One of the difficulties in calculating an actor's policy motivations is that political actors tend to hold back on taking a position. The more an actor can mask his policy preferences, perhaps the greater is his bargaining position.

Beliefs

Closely related to an actor's motivational set are his beliefs, attitudes, and values. Whether one wants to talk about belief systems,¹² operational codes,¹³ or an appreciative system,¹⁴ the point is

that the actors have certain orientations toward their empirical worlds. They will perceive policies through their own particular frames of reference. An actor's frame of reference, his lens, may be constructed from a political ideology or it may only comprise a set of disjointed beliefs. Indeed, beliefs can be encapsulated in a few dominant words, such as in an actor's expressed beliefs in the virtues of "local control" or the advantages of "competition." Beliefs state what is considered desirable and assert notions about means and ends and cause and effect. They are judgments about reality.

Perhaps I can make clear the importance of anticipating an actor's beliefs by referring to former Secretary Robert McNamara's TFX decision.¹⁵ No doubt in the minds of many people, McNamara was the personification of rational, analytical approaches to problem solving. Compared to domestic social problems, the decisions as to which contractor will build an airplane seem a cut-and-dried matter. But no one really knew whether either competing contractor could actually build this sophisticated aircraft to meet specified performance characteristics and estimated costs. McNamara chose General Dynamics—Grumman, while a unified military chose Boeing. Behind the conflict was a clash over beliefs about means and ends. McNamara believed in "commonality" or one plane for two services; the Navy and Air Force preferred their own planes. McNamara believed that cost estimates should be realistic; the services considered costs a secondary matter and had operated for years on the foot-in-the-door approach. McNamara believed that performance had a price; the military considered that greater performance was worth some additional risk. McNamara chose General Dynamics — Grumman, not on the basis of hard data, but on his beliefs that their proposal was more faithful to the concept of commonality, was based on more realistic cost estimates, and had less risk than Boeing's. Because there was uncertainty and the data was suspicious, judgmental beliefs determined the decision.

It is essential to consider the background and intensity of an actor's beliefs. Simply dividing actors into friends and enemies of a policy is insufficient for judging political feasibility. For example, in the health policy space, the American Medical Association elevated fee-for-service not as a bookkeeping convenience but as a principle. Instead of adopting the wisdom of the ancient

Chinese, the AMA encourages payment by the illness rather than prepayment for health. For some doctors, prepayment conjures visions of group health and of violating the standards of excellence maintained by the individual doctor-patient relationship. The belief in fee-for-service is thus an intense defense mechanism against socialism.

Resources

Every important actor in a policy issue area has something which another actor wants or values or finds worthwhile. That something is called a resource. Resources satisfy motivations.¹⁶ And as diverse as man's motives are, from hunger to self-actualization, so are his resources. Money, a job, the law, love—the list seems endless. To get out of this descriptive mess, political scientists have developed generic lists of resources.¹⁷ Following is my list of generic resources, with specific examples listed in the right-hand column:

<u>Generic Resource</u>	<u>Specific Resource</u>
material	job with increased wages
symbolic	assignment to high-status congressional committee
physical	street violence
position	Office of the President
information	lobbyist expertise
skill	sense of timing

The analyst will want to know which specific resources the skillful actor will use in gathering support and assembling coalitions. Skill is a special resource because it helps determine how effectively the other resources are deployed. Political skill can be exercised in a variety of ways.¹⁸ For example, an actor's sense of timing may be crucial—when to use norms of reciprocity, when selectively to remind others of the rules of the game, when to propose issues. An actor can also, of course, exploit his personal attributes by developing political support from other actors who desire to establish rapport and identify with him. He can build resources by encouraging other actors' feelings of deference, respect for authority, and notions as to what is legitimate.

Sites

A scenario is like a story, a narrative or, better yet, a play. The major organizing device of this play is called the site. It is more than a scene in a play, because it is a decisional point of conse-

quence. The congressional committee, the meeting with the agency head, the national convention of interested citizens are all examples of sites. Like the temporal variable, the site fixes the action. It locates a potential constraint in a particular situation. The site provides a reference point to discuss the key actors, their values, motivations, beliefs, and resources.

For each site the analyst develops a political map which portrays the positions of the relevant political forces. In analyzing the political feasibility of the statewide property tax for financing California's schools, for example, the Senate Committee on Education was found to be a decisive site which had the following disposition of forces:

Policy Alternative: Statewide property tax		
Site: California Senate Committee on Education		
<u>Supporters</u>	<u>Indifferents</u>	<u>Opposers</u>
State Superintendent of Public Instruction	Governor	California Taxpayers' Association
Poor school districts	Average-wealth school districts	Wealthy school districts
California Teachers Association	The Public	Large urban school districts
Democratic legislators		California Real Estate Association
Educational professionals		Farm and oil interests
		Republican legislators

With our political system's myriad points of access and complex institutional structure, how can the analyst determine which sites are decisive? First, the analyst does not start with sites. He starts with actors, and works toward sites. Second, the process of scenario writing is iterative, involving identifying holes in the data, tentative choices of sites, and many drafts. Third, the analyst is selective by choosing only a few sites. He is not writing a detailed case history where every twist and turn of congressional meandering, for example, is relevant. And, fourth, the analyst looks for necessary accuracy. He does not have to pinpoint exact locations in time and space. It is not important that an assistant secretary and bureau chief actually decide to press for a particular policy at lunch. What is important is that

the analyst anticipate that some bureaucratic site will have a central significance in his scenario.

Exchanges: Judgment and Policy Design

After organizing his information in the form of a set of political maps, the analyst then predicts or estimates likely outcomes. He converts a static picture of politics into a dynamic one by estimating which actors will be politically effective, which will exercise power.¹⁹ More importantly, he identifies the possible areas of policy consensus and conflict. In short, he should be able to design an alternative policy proposal which can achieve the requisite political support.

Designing such a proposal implies anticipating the makeup of the coalitions necessary for acceptance at decisive sites. Held together by side payments and policy modifications, such coalitions are mostly built by a series of exchanges. Actors will exchange specific resources to achieve specific outcomes, such as political support, and underlying much of the dynamics of politics is this simple notion of exchange. One can observe it in logrolling, bargaining, and many of the sophisticated variants of adjustments between actors.²⁰

The concept of exchange, however, does have its difficulties. Depending on how it is used, the analyst may find himself making vacuous and tautological statements. Then again, there is behavior which is not adequately described by the concept of exchange. There are many examples of cooperative political behavior which do not involve an exchange of resources. Actors also have been known to expend their resources without expecting something in return.

Sometimes it is hard to predict whether a series of exchanges will result in the requisite political support. In such cases, it might be easier to look for shortcuts or substitutes for the specification of resources and exchanges; for example, the analyst could simplify his job by identifying a pivotal legislative actor who can deliver the votes without worrying how the actor does it. Another shortcut, which may be worth the cost, is to use some of the tools of political science, such as legislative roll-call analysis and survey research. It may not be necessary for the analyst, with his paper and pencil feasibility study, to get into the mechanics of coalition building.

The Specification Requirement

Regardless of shortcuts, it should be clear that political analysis requires a great deal of specific

information. If it is any consolation, other aspects of policy analysis have the same requirement. Let me give an illustration from the field of cost analysis to show the importance of specification. Suppose an analyst is examining the choice between competing advanced transport airplanes. Each transport will fly so fast, at such-and-such altitude, carry so much, and be able to land at certain types of airfields. The planes, in other words, are described in terms of what they can do. But having performance statements is useless to the analyst. An infinite number of designs could satisfy these performance statements. Performance must be converted into the detail of designs, which includes information about engineering, tooling, fabrication, and materials. Policy analysts cannot estimate costs in the absence of relevant design specifications, otherwise the process would be like asking the price of a three-bedroom house without specifying its design, location, type of construction, or square footage.

Similarly in the realms of politics, it does little good to know that veto groups characterize the American political system. The policy analyst has to know which veto group, when, how, and why. He must be able to evaluate and judge which specific groups will be active in his policy issue area. Who can be moved? What are the fall-back positions of these specific actors? Are the policy alternatives which are being considered within the range of political compromise? As a political scientist, I find it interesting that we can demonstrate a recurring alliance between bureaucracy, clientele, and legislative committee. As a policy analyst, however, I find this generalized golden triangle less interesting. Instead, I want to know the details of the specific triangle or triangles likely to determine policy in my issue area.

Political Error

Political prediction and error are bedfellows. The policy analyst who wishes to make political judgments may be in bad shape. As he writes his scenario he will find out how little he knows. Yet, he has no choice; if he is to include political variables in his analysis, he will make political judgments, and some of these judgments will be wrong. What consolation is there for the analyst who is concerned with the inaccuracy of political observations?

First, there is the relative argument: the rest of the analysis is not accurate. Models, integral signs, numbers give the appearance of accuracy. But

economic data, for example, can also be wrong.²¹ In analysis, costs are fabricated and benefits are measured by inadequate surrogates. The lack of a market for public expenditures makes price difficult to determine. The use of discount rates and the choice of which one presents perplexing problems. Externalities that cannot be measured are pushed aside. Economists know all of this, and their motto is: some analysis is better than no analysis.²²

Second, consideration of policy and political alternatives affords some protection against error.²³ When a variable is uncertain, the analyst will alter that variable to see if the changes significantly affect outcomes. Such sensitivity analysis is the usual tool for coping with uncertainty. At present, the political policy analyst cannot possibly manipulate his variables in this manner. By looking at alternatives, however, he can extend the informational content of his scenario.

The analyst's scenario depicts each alternative as a prospective decision-tree. The nodes on each tree are the sites that represent the key political constraints or hurdles. Branches indicate actors, their positions, and likely outcomes of their interactions. On the one hand, each decision-tree only roughly maps political feasibility and does not provide a blueprint for manipulating a policy alternative through the hurdles of the political system. On the other hand, the scenario with its several decision-trees can indicate a path by which success may be achieved. By exercising his own political judgment, the analyst can recommend then a particular political path and policy alternative.

Will a faulty analysis in any way pre-empt the client's political judgment? With any analysis, there is always the danger that the client will accept it without scrutiny. On the political side, this danger is minimal. Given the uncertainty of politics, everyone can be his own political expert. The client can always choose his own path through the decision-tree. Having several decision-trees (in the form of alternative political analyses) reduces the risk caused by the analyst presenting the wrong tree.

Finally, the analyst must understand what the purpose of his work is. He is studying his policy issue area as a prelude to action. His work attempts to circumscribe a complex problem. This nibbles at problems, but does not solve them. At all times, moreover, he should be aware that his activity costs. To attempt to reduce error by

extending his research may not be worth additional costs. By a judicious combination of selection and specification, he can focus on the primary events of a future political reality. Being wrong some of the time is an occupational hazard that he must stoically accept.

An Analytical Integration

Once we accept the idea that political feasibility studies are a useful input into policy analysis, then the next consideration is the integration of such political studies into analysis. The current crop of analysts learn about politics on the job. Both their clients and their colleagues tell them what to avoid. Everybody the analyst works with is a political expert, and the analyst, in turn, soon becomes one.²⁴

The trouble with such expertise is that it is mostly a confirmation of prevailing wisdom, tends to be negative, and dampens the search for creative policy alternatives. His knowledge of politics reinforces his tendency to get closure on the policy problem. Obviously if the analyst does not attempt to get closure, the enterprise of policy analysis would evaporate. When a client is waiting for an answer, the scope of the analysis has to be narrowed to begin to approach a solution. In part, then, the integration problem is to avoid premature closure and to insure that the analyst introduces political judgment at the appropriate time.

What is the appropriate time? Much will depend on situational factors. One approach would be to conceive of analysis as a two-step process: (1) supply an answer based on quantitative and economic reasoning, and (2) then modify that answer using political considerations. Politics, in other words, becomes an additional criterion in the selection of a preferred alternative.

Another approach, more difficult but also probably more effective, is to introduce politics at each stage of a policy analysis. The analyst would consider political feasibility in the selection of a policy problem, in the definition of that problem, in the identification of alternatives, and in the recommendation of preferred policy alternatives. Implicit in this approach is that analysis is an iterative procedure, a continuing interplay between means and ends, as new information is introduced into the process.

Another question in the analytical marriage of politics and analysis is who will provide political

expertise? The experience of think-tanks, while not necessarily to be emulated, is instructive. When political scientists are part of an analytical staff, the extent of integration of the political perspective is a function of the particular policy problem and organization. I have worked on policy problems where the political scientist wrote scenarios governing the activities of the rest of the analytical team. Unfortunately, I have also seen political scientists work by themselves on institutional and strategic political studies. They seldom talked to other members of the analytical staff, and their clients were outside the organization.

Politics can also be integrated with analysis through the training of the individual analyst. Programs designed to train policy analysts are sprouting up at a number of academic institutions, for example, Harvard University, State University of New York at Buffalo, University of Minnesota, University of Michigan, University of Texas, and the University of California at Berkeley. These institutions have the opportunity to integrate politics into analysis by starting with the analyst. He can be taught enough from the various disciplines to enable him to use both qualitative and quantitative methods.

Simple political sensitivity is not enough. If the analyst is going to have a political orientation toward his work, he should be taught to use his knowledge of politics and to exercise his political judgment. The point is that the student must actively, *analytically* engage in politics himself: learning about the political process—that there is a President, a Congress, and that policy making is complex—is interesting but insufficient. He must learn how to assess the political implications of policy alternatives. Analysts, for example, may be asked whether a particular policy will develop support for an institution or a regime. Analysts will be expected to trace the consequences of adopting a policy not just in substantive terms, but in political terms as well.

Although we can expect an active traffic between political and non-political analytical considerations, it is unlikely that political variables can now be formally integrated into the model structure of an analysis. Some work, outside of policy analysis, has attempted to integrate voter maximization concepts into model structures.²⁵ In such cases, the political ideas tend to be rather simple and perhaps even naive. In cases where the political ideas are complex and sophisticated, as in

the analysis of public policy issues, formal integration may be impossible.

Undoubtedly, political knowledge can influence the structure of the mathematical models of analysis and the data that goes into them. The extent of that influence will partially depend on the state-of-the-art of political science and its ability to quantify political considerations. Moreover, there are important qualitative factors, such as the political skill of an influential actor, which when quantified may lose their significance. In any event, before there is formal integration, there should be a political methodology for policy analysis.²⁶

Constraints

Policy analysis will not differ from its predecessors unless we recognize and deal with the constraints facing the analyst. Urging the use of political knowledge in analysis is not the same as doing it. His role may limit his political discretion. His policy problem, whether assigned or by his own choice, may preclude an investigation of political implications. When he has little political expertise, the credibility of his political recommendations may be severely diminished. Under such conditions his clients may prefer to be their own political experts.

Moreover, the analyst also faces a number of technical constraints. For his problem, he must be able to specify a policy issue area, and then he must gather detailed political information and organize a political map. From his map and analysis, he must have the courage to make political judgments. Some of these judgments will be wrong, and even if correct he will find it difficult to integrate his knowledge of politics into the rest of his study. He will then wish for a simple and accurate political methodology.

For years now, students of public administration and political science have been studying specific institutions and specific actors. From case histories to cross-national surveys, we have a good deal of theories and information on voters, legislators, bureaucrats, and Presidents. Our problem is not that we do not know anything, but how should we use what we know. The analytical application of politics depends on our ability and desire to make this required conversion.

Notes

1. I am indebted to Gene Bardach, Robert Biller, John Kramer, Robert Nakamura, Allan Sindler, and Aaron Wildavsky, who gave me useful comments and criticism. In particular, I want to thank Stanley Scott for his editorial assistance. He worked on my manuscript as if it were his own. Despite all this help, this paper is only a beginning. My purpose is to provoke discussion and to encourage others to develop a political methodology for policy analysis.
2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Hearings, Planning—Programming—Budgeting*, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, Part 5, p. 310.
3. Charles L. Schultze, *The Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 89.
4. Yehezkel Dror, "Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government Service," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXVII (September 1967), p. 200.
5. The use of the Delphi method is an alternative way where suitable political expertise is available. The application of the Delphi method to policy analysis is discussed by Yehezkel Dror in "The Prediction of Political Feasibility," *Futures*, Vol. I (June 1969), pp. 282-288. For a description of the Delphi method, see Olaf Helmer, *Social Technology* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).
6. See Bertrand de Jouvenal, *The Art of Conjecture* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), for an excellent discussion of "political futures." See also Benjamin Akzin, "On Conjecture in Political Science," *Political Studies*, Vol. XIV (February 1966), pp. 1-14.
7. In this respect, Yehezkel Dror has been particularly helpful to me; see his *Policy Analysis: A Theoretic Framework and Some Basic Concepts*, P-4156 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, July 1969).
8. For a short history of Medicare, see James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 287-321.
9. Wildavsky points out the consequences for decision making in a diffused issue-context and in a polarized issue-context; see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Analysis of Issue-Contexts in the Study of Decision Making," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XXIV (November 1962), pp. 717-732. That different policy issue areas can have different politics or decision making, see the work of Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Science," *World Politics*, Vol. XVI (July 1964), pp. 677-715, and his "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Towards an Antidote for Technocracy," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXX (May/June 1970), pp. 314-325.
10. For a brief review of some of the problems of identifying actors and some suggestions as to how to

- proceed, see Kenneth J. Gergen, "Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of Policy Formation," in Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen (eds.), *The Study of Policy Formation* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 181-203.
11. Roland N. McKean presents an interesting way of looking at motivations; see his "Costs and Benefits from Different Viewpoints," in Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller (eds.), *Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management*, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 199-220.
 12. Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 31-53. See also his *Beliefs Attitudes and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968).
 13. Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XIII (June 1969), pp. 190-222.
 14. Sir Geoffrey Vickers, *The Art of Judgment* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 36-49 and 67-74.
 15. I base this paragraph on Robert J. Art's excellent case history; see *The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1968).
 16. See Dorwin Cartwright, "Influence, Leadership and Control," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations*, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), pp. 31-32, for the close connection between motivations and resources.
 17. For example, see Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 83-96; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 226-267; and, more recently, Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 49-91.
 18. In the area of political skill, Bardach's work is outstanding; see Eugene Bardach, "The Politico as Virtuoso: The Skill Factor in California Mental Health Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1969) pp. 405-490.
 19. For an excellent review of this literature, see Robert A. Dahl, "Power," in David L. Sills, (ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XII (1968), pp. 405-415.
 20. Lindblom analyzes many of these variants; see Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-Making through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 21-84. A number of social scientists have suggested the utility of the concept of exchange; for example, see George C. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXIII (May 1958), pp. 597-606; Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 86-125; and Robert L. Curry, Jr., and Larry L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange: Economic Reasoning in Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).
 21. See Oskar Morgenstern, *On the Accuracy of Economic Observations*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 13-61.
 22. I am not asserting that the provision of erroneous analysis is a virtue, but that analysts perceive their work as valuable for policy making despite its limitations. For example, Prest and Turvey in their excellent review state: "An important advantage of a cost-benefit study is that it forces those responsible to quantify costs and benefits as far as possible rather than rest content with vague qualitative judgments or personal hunches. This is obviously a good thing in itself; some information is always better than none." See A. R. Prest and R. Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: a Survey," *The Economic Journal*, Vol. LXXV (December 1965), p. 729.
 23. For the importance of considering alternatives, see Fred Ikle, "Can Social Predictions be Evaluated?" in *Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, Daedalus* (1967), pp. 733-758.
 24. The political role of the analyst is of central concern to me in my other work, but space limitations preclude my expanded discussion.
 25. See, for example, Otto A. Davis and George H. Harris, Jr., "A Political Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditure: The Case of Municipalities," *National Tax Journal*, Vol. XIX (September 1966), pp. 259-275.
 26. For recent work by political scientists in this area, see the essays in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968); James W. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968); and Bill Cavala and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Feasibility of Income by Right," *Public Policy*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (1970), pp. 321-354.