Laudan Transcript

Larry Laudan is a contemporary philosopher of science and epistemologist. He has strongly criticized the traditions of positivism, realism, and relativism, and he has defended a view of science as a privileged and progressive institution against popular challenges. Laudan's philosophical view of research traditions is seen as an important alternative to Imre Lakatos's research programs live in Korea. Laudan took his PhD in philosophy at Princeton University and then taught at University College London and for many years at the University of Pittsburgh. Subsequently, he taught at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, University of Hawaii, and the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He presently teaches at the University of Texas Austin. His more recent work has been on legal epistemology, philosophical work. Laudan's most influential book is Progress and Its Problems in which he charges philosophers of science with paying lip service to the view that science is fundamentally a problem solving activity without taking seriously the views, implications for the history of science and its philosophy, and without questioning certain issues in the historiography and methodology of science.

Against empiricism, which is represented by Karl Popper and revolutionism represented by Thomas Kuhn, Laudan maintained in Progress and Its Problems that science is an evolving process that accumulates more empirically validated evidence while solving conceptual anomalies. At the same time, mere evidence collecting or empirical confirmation does not constitute the true mechanism of scientific advancement, conceptual resolution, and comparison of the solutions of anomalies provided by various theories form an indispensable part of the evolution of science.

Laudan is particularly well known for his argument against the claim that the cumulative success of science shows that science must really describe how the world really is. Laudan famously argued in his 1981 article, A confutation of convergent realism, that the history of science furnishes vast evidence of empirically successful theories that were later rejected from subsequent perspectives. Their unobservable terms were judged not to refer, and thus they cannot be regarded as true or even approximately true. Even those who disagree with Laudan recognize that his utilizing detailed evidence from the history of science is an important contribution to how philosophy of science is practiced in beyond positivism and relativism. Laudan wrote that the aim of science is to secure theories with a high problem solving effectiveness and that scientific progress is possible when empirical data is diminished.

Indeed, on this model, it is possible that to change from an empirically well supported theory to a less well supported one could be progressive, provided that the latter resolved significant conceptual difficulties confronting the former. Finally, the better theory solves more conceptual problems while minimizing empirical anomalies. Laudan has also written on risk management and the subject of terrorism. He has argued that moral outrage and compassion are the proper responses to terrorism, but fear for oneself and one's life is not. The risk that the average American will be a victim of terrorism is extremely remote. He wrote The Book of Risks in 1996, which details the relative risks for various accidents.

Selected writings, 1977, Progress and Its Problems towards the theory of scientific growth, ISBN 978-0-52-003721-2. 1981, Science and Hypothesis. 1984, Science and Values, ISBN 978-0-52-05743-2. 1990, Science and Relativism Dialogues on the Philosophy of Science, ISBN 9 78-0-22-646949-2. 1995, The Book of Risks. 1996, Beyond Positivism and Relativism, ISBN 978-0-81-332469-2. 1997, Danger Ahead. 2006, Truth, Error and Criminal Law, an essay in legal epistemology.